/ The People Who Are Steadfast Under Persecution /

The People Who Are Steadfast Under Persecution

Chapter 2

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A 16

Who Has Had an Interest in Persecuting Jehovah’s Witnesses in Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation?

The church-state alliance in its fight against sects in the Russian Empire, and its “revival.”

Russian history includes a long period of persecution of so-called “sectarians.” The status of Orthodoxy as the state religion was enshrined in the Law Code of the Russian Empire and in its Penal and Correctional Code. In the Russian Empire religions not recognized by the state, which were called “sects,” were categorized according to their degree of “harmfulness” into “most harmful,” “harmful,” and “less harmful.”¹ The “Bible Students” were not widely known in the Russian Empire and did not appear in its legislative acts. The fight against sectarianism in the Russian Empire was carried out by means of close collaboration of the state with the Orthodox Church.² In the USSR, the state proclaimed freedom of conscience, but in practice, fought against all religions. The Russian Federation adopted a constitution and laws that guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion. These were followed for a while, but then a repressive policy toward religious minorities re-emerged.

Currently, the alliance between state and church in counteracting the so-called “sects” that took shape in the Russian Empire has once again become a kind of ideal for the development and strengthening of state-church relations. A prominent and observant religious studies scholar, Italian Professor Massimo Introvigne, has drawn attention to this fact. As the scholar notes, Patriarch Kirill and the president of Russia, V. V. Putin, have forged an unwritten agreement: Kirill guarantees Putin the unconditional support of the Orthodox Church, and Putin guarantees Kirill protection against competition from other religions, by implementing various measures. Of these measures, the primary one is the joint promotion by the state and the Moscow Patriarchate of the concept of “spiritual security” as a part of national security. “Spiritual security” means that any threat to the Orthodox identity of Russia is at the same time a threat to the security of the state, and it becomes a job for the police.³ “Orthodoxy and the nuclear industry strengthen Russian statehood and security” – this is how Vladimir Putin responded to a question from a journalist from Sarov about what place he would assign to Orthodoxy in the future of the country and what his strategy is for the nuclear industry.⁴ Reflecting on why Russia’s authorities have once again “fallen into the same trap” as did their distant predecessors in the Russian Empire brings to mind the Biblical thought: “What has been is what will be, and what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9). The question arises: What forces are impelling the Russian state to take up the fight against so-called “sects” again and again?

Patriarch Kirill and the president of Russia, V. V. Putin, have forged an unwritten agreement: Kirill guarantees Putin the unconditional support of the Orthodox Church and Putin guarantees Kirill protection against competition from other religions by implementing various measures

The efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church to involve the state in the fight against sects during the Soviet period.

The Soviet Union was dominated by communist ideology, which included the promotion of atheism and the infringement of believers’ rights. Nevertheless, there were influential hierarchs in the Russian Orthodox Church who considered it necessary for the Church to resume its active participation in the fight against sects; it tried to involve the state in counteracting sects in the interests of the Orthodox Church. For example, in 1946 Grigory (Chukov, 1870-1955), Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, a permanent member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, prepared a report entitled “On the Issue of Combating Sectarianism”⁵ for the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Patriarch Alexy I (Simansky)⁶ and the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church.

It is worth noting that the USSR Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was closely connected to the state security agencies. Thus, Georgiy Grigoryevich Karpov (1898-1967), Major General of the People’s Commissariat of the USSR State Security, was chairman of the Council from 1943 to 1960. Until August 1947, Georgiy Karpov was simultaneously chairman of the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church and head of the church department of the USSR State Security.⁷ As is evident from published correspondence,⁸ Patriarch Alexy I and Georgiy Karpov developed a close, confidential relationship.

The USSR Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was closely connected to the state security agencies

The Soviet authorities did not need the initiatives of the Orthodox hierarchs to join the battle against sects. The Communist Party and other state institutions of the USSR independently developed their own policy toward religion, driven by communist dogmas and pragmatic interests. The fight against “sects” in the USSR was extremely active.

Solidifying the “collaboration” between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state in the fight against religious minorities in the post-Soviet period.

The Constitution proclaims: “The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. Religious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law.” (Article 14)⁹ However, in reality the influence of the country’s largest religious organization – the Russian Orthodox Church – on state policy is a significant factor in decisions made by state authorities, including those affecting the status of religious minorities.

According to “The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church” (2000), “counteracting the work of pseudo-religious structures that present a threat to the individual and society” is one of “the areas of church-state cooperation in the present historical period.”¹⁰

The Russian Constitution proclaims that… no religion may be established as a state or obligatory one

The Russian Orthodox Church distinguishes between “non-Orthodox confessions” and “sects.”¹¹ “Non-Orthodox confessions” include those who believe in the Holy Trinity and recognize the God-manhood of Jesus Christ.¹² On the “canonical territory” of the Russian Orthodox Church,¹³ they are recognized as having the right “to witness to their faith and conduct religious education among the population groups that traditionally belong to them.” That is, from the perspective of the Orthodox Church, for example, Catholics in Russia have the right to preach among the Polish population, who traditionally practice Catholicism, but they have no such right among Russians.

Those denominations that, like Jehovah’s Witnesses, believe that teachings about the Trinity and the God-manhood of Jesus Christ are not supported by the Bible are declared to be destructive sects whose missionary activities are categorically condemned.¹⁴

So-called “anticultism” has become a kind of “strike force” of the Russian Orthodox Church in the fight against religious minorities. Anticultism (anti-cult movement, sectophobia) is the common name for associations, groups, and individual enthusiasts who defend the idea that new religious movements and other religions, disparagingly referred to as sects or cults, are harmful. The activity of anti-cultists includes creating in the public consciousness a suspicious and hostile attitude toward religious minorities that have been labeled “sects” (“cults”), and endeavoring to lobby for laws prohibiting or restricting the activity of “sects.”

What is the essence of Russian anti-cultism?

In 1993, I met some of the employees of the Department of Religious Education and Catechism of the Moscow Patriarchate, including Alexander Dvorkin, who was considered the Department’s leading expert on combating “sects.” We had an in-depth conversation, which led me to the conclusion that the “anti-sectarian” activities of the Department of Religious Education and Catechism and other structures of the Moscow Patriarchate potentially pose a significant threat to freedom of conscience in Russia.

I formed a distinct impression of the personality of A. L. Dvorkin, who has become a kind of symbol of Russian anti-cultism: burning eyes, aggressive speech, unbridled demagoguery and poor knowledge of the topic under discussion. I felt I was looking at the character Khlestakov¹⁵ in the flesh.

Khlestakov and Dvorkin share a propensity for pathological lying. This is a specific psychological condition. According to some psychologists, pathological liars differ from ordinary liars – when pathological liars make false statements, they are convinced that they are telling the truth.

Unlike Khlestakov, who pretended to be an important person with extensive connections in the upper echelons of society but in reality, had no such connections, Alexander Dvorkin has managed to establish contacts with the “powers that be.” For example, one of his students was A. V. Konovalov, the Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation,¹⁶ who received an Orthodox theological education at the Saint Tikhon’s Orthodox University of Humanities.¹⁷

The “anti-sectarian” activities of the Department of Religious Education and Catechism potentially pose a significant threat to freedom of conscience in Russia

А. Dvorkin did not intend to study any religious movements that were new to Russia, or “sects.” In his opinion, as an Orthodox believer and an employee of the Moscow Patriarchate, he had no right to communicate with “heretics and sectarians.” He was proud of his knowledge and was fanatically convinced that he knew better than anyone everything about “sects.” “Where do you get information about new religious movements in Russia?” I asked Dvorkin. He replied, “Everything you need to know has already been published in the West by anti-cult organizations.”¹⁸

The fact is that A. Dvorkin and his associates saw their task as, above all, to induce state agencies to ban new religious movements or significantly limit the rights of those “sects” that could not be completely outlawed: to institute annual re-registration for “sectarian” organizations, to ban them from speaking in the media, and to involve law enforcement agencies and psychiatrists in the fight against them. According to these anti-cultists, the new religious movements are “pseudo-religions,” and the fight against them should be waged not by missionaries but by the police.

According to these anti-cultists, the new religious movements are “pseudo-religions,” and the fight against them should be waged not by missionaries but by the police

Dvorkin and other anti-cultists have succeeded in convincing government officials and law enforcement officials that “sects” are not only criminal organizations but also agents of influence by foreign intelligence services and promoters of alien cultures that are destroying the Russian state. The anti-cultists urged the state to strengthen its control over the spiritual well-being of society and to intensify its fight against the “destructive impact of sects.”

Admittedly, the Russian authorities were receptive to the influence of the anti-cult mythology. While Boris Yeltsin by and large adhered to the principles of freedom of conscience, his successors fell increasingly under the influence of anti-cultist notions.

In Russia, anti-cultists use such terms as “totalitarian sect” and “destructive cult,” which have become especially popular in the media and among law enforcement officials. An important feature of anti-cultism in modern Russia is its active support by the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, as early as 1994 the Council of Bishops adopted a resolution “On pseudo-Christian sects, neo-paganism, and occultism” that accused “sects” of destroying the traditional way of life established under the influence of the Orthodox Church, and stated that they “threaten the integrity of the national consciousness and cultural identity.”¹⁹

The target audience of anti-cultists in the Russian Federation is state authorities, law enforcement agencies, and the media. The anti-cult movement aims to present religious minorities that they have labeled “sects” as socially dangerous, inherently criminal entities against which the state and society must resolutely fight. The distinguishing feature of anti-cultism in modern Russia is its goal of imparting an official, national complexion to “anti-sectarian” policies by involving state authorities and law enforcement agencies as well as the judicial system in the fight against religious minorities (“sects”).

The anti-cult movement aims to present religious minorities that they have labeled “sects” as socially dangerous, inherently criminal entities

There is abundant evidence for such conclusions. One can examine, for example, the publications of the Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons, founded in 1993 with the blessing of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia. The president of this center is the aforementioned A. Dvorkin. Most of these publications accuse various “sects” of criminal offenses and promote the false claim that religious minorities undermine state security and are harmful to society and to the individual.

I agree absolutely with the conclusion of nationally and internationally known religious studies scholars that the “Center for Religious Studies in the name of Hieromartyr Irenaeus of Lyons” was the instigator of repression against many religious organizations, including Jehovah’s Witnesses.²⁰

The official website of the Moscow Patriarchate also contains materials dedicated to the fight against sects that are rife with speculation about the ability of “sectarians” to “influence politics, infiltrate weapon factories, and learn state secrets.”²¹

The first attempts to limit freedom of conscience in the Russian Federation were made as early as 1992-1993. At the request of Patriarch Alexy II (secular surname Ridiger), the Supreme Soviet advocated adjustments to the law on Freedom of Religion, and in 1993 passed several amendments to it. In particular, it restricted the activities of foreign missionaries, missions, and religious organizations and tightened control over the activities of so-called “non-traditional” religions. However, these amendments did not enter into force because Russian President Yeltsin dissolved the Supreme Soviet in October 1993.²²

The first attempts to limit freedom of conscience in the Russian Federation were made as early as 1992-1993

In the early 2000s, the fight against “sects” and the promulgation of anti-cultism became a fundamental focus of the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church and its lobbyists in government and the media. Thus, in 2004, after many years of litigation dating back to 1998, the Moscow Community of Jehovah’s Witnesses was liquidated and its activity banned.²³

It is interesting that as early as 1998, the future Patriarch Kirill, who was then Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, stated in an interview that “the Russian Orthodox Church does not welcome the activity of the sect ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses’ in Russia.” He claimed that Jehovah’s Witnesses are not Christians and that there have allegedly been cases where they have “bought the soul of a person or drawn them by other unscrupulous methods into the orbit of this denomination.”²⁴ However, the Metropolitan did not provide any specific instances of “souls being bought.”

Since 2009, increased support for anti-cultism by church and state has been especially noticeable.

An important event in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church occurred in 2009: on February 1, Kirill (secular name Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyaev, born in 1946) became the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Possessed of eloquence and an intense thirst for power, as a staunch opposer of sects, Patriarch Kirill significantly strengthened the cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state, using his new authority, among other things, to bolster the position of anti-cultists. Leaders and employees who respected the principles of freedom of conscience were purged from state agencies and replaced with proponents of anti-cultism. For example, Minister of Justice V. A. Konovalov removed qualified experts and scholars from the Council of Experts for conducting state religious expert studies under the Ministry of Justice and replaced them with anti-cultists.²⁵ On April 3, 2009, Alexander Dvorkin, known for his radical anti-cultist views, became the Chairman of the Council of Experts.²⁶

Leaders and employees who respected the principles of freedom of conscience were purged from state agencies and replaced with proponents of anti-cultism

In fact, since 2009, lobbyists for the Russian Orthodox Church, including anti-cultists with their concepts, have become dominant within the government agencies involved in the development and implementation of state policy toward religious organizations. We can state that since 2009 they have been acting as informal initiators and authors (or co-authors) of conceptual approaches to solving the problems of relations between the state and religious associations. It was lobbyists for the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and the anti-cultists who initiated the ban on the religious organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

It was lobbyists for the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and the anti-cultists who initiated the ban on the religious organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses

I agree with the opinion of human rights activists Lyudmila Alekseeva²⁷ and Svetlana Gannushkina,²⁸ expressed in July 2017, that the Supreme Court’s ban on the Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia and its legally registered local religious organizations “is linked to the Russian Orthodox Church’s increased influence on government policy,” and that “now prisons await Jehovah’s Witnesses.”²⁹

Anti-cultist mythology often prompts law enforcement agencies to initiate and investigate cases against those considered sectarians – including Jehovah’s Witnesses – and courts to hand down unjust judgments.

Let us “dig deeper” and examine the main anti-cult myth that was used to justify the banning and prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

The anti-cult myth as unofficial grounds for banning and prosecuting Jehovah’s Witnesses

Anti-cultists claim that Jehovah’s Witnesses manifest blind, submissive obedience to their leaders. And since the Governing Body of Jehovah’s Witnesses is located in the United States and is therefore allegedly under the control of the political powers of that state, the anti-cultists are convinced that Jehovah’s Witnesses can be used by the United States to destabilize the situation in Russia.

This has absolutely no basis in reality, but this myth had a significant impact on the ruling to ban the religious organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses as people potentially posing a threat to the security of the Russian Federation.

First of all, it is important to understand that Jehovah’s Witnesses do not advocate unquestioning and mindless submission to the leaders of their religious organization. They believe that a true Christian should not accept anything blindly, relying on the authority of one leader or another. A believer should be guided primarily by Bible principles, and when the Bible does not give a clear and definite answer to a certain question, he should listen to and follow his Bible-trained conscience.³⁰

Jehovah’s Witnesses do not advocate unquestioning and mindless submission to the leaders of their religious organization

It is no coincidence that both the literature of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the public talks of their leaders always contain references to the Bible, which believers take as their most convincing arguments. And the religious life of Jehovah’s Witnesses itself includes study of the Bible and Bible-based literature, and discussion of issues and real-life situations designed to develop the Bible-trained conscience of the believer.

The Governing Body of Jehovah’s Witnesses adheres to the principle of not teaching anything beyond what is written in the Bible (1 Corinthians 4:6), and directs all the attention of believers to the Bible and its instructions. And Jehovah’s Witnesses firmly believe that its instructions condemning aggression and violence are not subject to interpretation (Psalm 11:5; Hebrews 12:14). Over the 150 years of the existence of their organization, Jehovah’s Witnesses have convincingly proven their commitment to nonviolence in all situations, even the most critical.

The strict Christian neutrality of Jehovah’s Witnesses and their non-participation in political life also deserve the closest attention (John 17:16; Matthew 22:21). Neither the leadership of the religious organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses nor individual believers are controlled by any political powers; they do not participate in any political events or actions.

Jehovah’s Witnesses maintain strict Christian neutrality and do not participate in politics

This stems from specific features of the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses. They believe that in 1914, Jesus Christ received his kingship in heaven and that Satan and his demons were driven from heaven to earth; that same year marked the beginning of the “last days” – the transitional period from human rule to the thousand-year Kingdom of Jesus Christ, which will be established on earth after Armageddon (the decisive battle between the forces of good and evil, in which the forces of good will achieve a final victory). As already noted, Jehovah’s Witnesses are not going to participate in this battle, “since the vision in Revelation chapter 19 reveals only armies in heaven as participating in the warfare as supporters of Jesus Christ…none of Jehovah’s Christian servants on earth will participate in the fighting.”³¹

Jehovah’s Witnesses firmly believe that their calling is to be subjects of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ here and now on earth. It is precisely for this reason that they maintain strict neutrality and do not participate in politics.

Thus, particular features of the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses make it impossible for others to use the members of this religious organization to destabilize situation in the Russian Federation in the interests of political powers, including those of foreign nations.

Unfortunately, the myth that Jehovah’s Witnesses pose a threat to state security influenced the country’s leaders and became the real reason behind the unjust decision made on April 20, 2017, by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to ban the Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia and all legally registered local religious organizations of Jehovah’s Witnesses.

The question may arise: how do I know that it was precisely this myth that was the real reason for declaring all legal entities of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia extremist? One might consider this to be an “author’s hypothesis” that emerged from my unsuccessful attempts both before and after the April 20, 2017, decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to present the argument to the leadership of the Federation Council³² and other state authorities that banning the religious organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia was illegal, and also pointless in view of their steadfastness under persecution.

Those with whom I spoke, who were well informed about the attitudes of those in the upper echelons of power, explained to me that the decision to ban was irreversibly made on the basis of information that the Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses is located in a hostile country and that they could be used to destabilize the situation in Russia.

1
This classification was first established in 1842 by a decree of the Special Provisional Committee on the affairs of dissenters in consultation with the Holy Synod. ↩︎
2
See more: M. O. Shakhov, Religious Policy of the Russian State: Textbook, Moscow, Publishing house RAGS, 2003; A. S. Prughavin, Monastic Prisons in the Struggle against Sectarianism: on the Issue of Religious Tolerance, Moscow, 1905; I. Aivazov, Russian Sectarianism, Moscow, Publishing house of A. I. Snegireva, 1915. [all only in Russian] ↩︎
3
See: Massimo Introvigne, Ukraine: Why the Moscow Patriarch supports Putin’s war, Bitter Winter, October 3, 2022. ↩︎
4
“Putin believes Orthodoxy and nuclear shield strengthen Russia” RIA Novosti, February 1, 2007. [only in Russian] ↩︎
5
“On the Issue of Combating Sectarianism,” a report of Metropolitan Grigory (Chukov) submitted to His Holiness the Patriarch for submission to the Council on the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, scholarly theological portal “bogoslov.ru” (https://bogoslov.ru/article/669749). [only in Russian] ↩︎
6
Patriarch Alexy I (secular Sergey Vladimirovich Simansky; 1877-1970) – Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, occupied the Moscow Patriarchal Throne for over 25 years, starting from February 4, 1945. ↩︎
7
In August 1947 G. G. Karpov was discharged for health reasons and was enlisted in the KGB reserves. ↩︎
8
N. A. Krivova, Letters of Patriarch Alexy I to the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Council of People’s Commissars – Council of Ministers of the USSR, 1945-1970. In two volumes, Moscow, Rosspan, 2009-2010. Vol. 1, 1945-1953, 2009. p.848; Vol. 2, 1954-1970, 2010, p.672. ↩︎
9
The Fundamentals of the Constitutional System, The Constitution of the Russian Federation (www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-02.htm). ↩︎
10
The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, section III, paragraph 8. ↩︎
11
See: Basic Principles of the Attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church Toward the Other Christian Confessions (document adopted at the Council of Bishops in 2000). ↩︎
12
According to the doctrine formulated at the Fourth Ecumenical Council (451 C.E. or A.D.), Jesus Christ is God-man and in Him are united two natures – divine and human. The natures in Jesus Christ are united, not one (i.e., they remain whole, and do not form a mixed nature of half-god, half-man), invariable (i.e., the Deity continues to possess its properties without any reduction or weakening, and human nature retains human characteristics), indivisible (i.e., they do not form two separate persons, but a single person), and inseparable (i.e., never separated and cannot be separated from the moment of conception and remain in Christ after the ascension). ↩︎
13
“Canonical territory” is a term used in the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to substantiate claims for securing exclusive rights of the ROC to certain territories, where all religious activity of other churches (both Orthodox and non-Orthodox) is perceived as unfriendly. The Russian Orthodox Church claims that its “canonical territory” includes 16 countries: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Japan, and also all of Africa and all believers residing in other countries and voluntarily entering the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church with parishes throughout the world. ↩︎
14
Basic Principles of the Attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church Toward the Other Christian Confessions (document adopted at the Council of Bishops in 2000), Section 6, paragraph 3. ↩︎
15
Ivan Alexandrovich Khlestakov – a character in Nikolai Gogol’s comedy “The Government Inspector” (1836), an inspired and shameless liar and braggart; hence the expression “khlestakovshchina” that comes from his surname, is defined as shameless bragging in S. I. Ozhegov’s Dictionary of the Russian Language. [only in Russian] ↩︎
16
Aleksander Vladimirovich Konovalov (born 1968, Leningrad), Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation from May 12, 2008 to January 15, 2020. From January 31, 2020, Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. ↩︎
17
Interview of A. V. Konovalov, RG.RU, July 19, 2007 (https://rg.ru/2007/07/19/konovalov.html). [only in Russian] ↩︎
18
S. I. Ivanenko, Notes of a Religious Expert. Introduction to the book – Konrad Löw, Von “Hexen” und Hexenjägern, Moscow, publishing house Gumanitariy, 1995, pp.20-24. [not available in English] ↩︎
19
See: Interdict “On the Pseudo-Christian Sects, Neopaganism, and Occultism” paragraph 9. [only in Russian] ↩︎
20
See: Luigi Bersano (University of Turin, Italy), Boris Falikov (Moscow State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia), Willy Fotre (Human Rights Without Borders, Brussels, Belgium), Ludmila Filipovich (Department of Religious Studies, Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences, Kiev, Ukraine), Massimo Introvigne (Center for the Study of New Religions, Turin, Italy), Bernadette Rigal-Cellar (University of Bordeaux-Montaigne, Bordeaux, France). Sympathy for the Devil: The Anti-Cult Federation of FECRIS, China and Russia. FECRIS support for religious repression in Russia (https://bitterwinter.org/5-fecriss-support-religious-repression-in-russia). ↩︎
21
See, for example: the Russian Orthodox University discussed the characteristics of sects and their influence on politics, official website of the Moscow Patriarchate (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5782043.html). [only in Russian] ↩︎
22
For more information, see: Russian Federation: from the new law “On Freedom of Religion” to the new Constitution of 1990-1993, by I. M. Sovetov. ↩︎
23
In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights upheld a lawsuit filed by Jehovah’s Witnesses and found a violation of Articles 6, 9 and 11 of the European Convention in a Russian court decision banning the activities of the Religious Community Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moscow. ↩︎
24
Metropolitan Kirill: The Orthodox Church does not welcome the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia (https://k-istine.ru/sects/iegova_witness/iegova_witness_news-130.htm). [only in Russian] ↩︎
25
One of those excluded from the Council was its deputy chairman, Professor Igor Yakovlevich Kanterov (1938-2018), a researcher of non-traditional religions and cults and one of the most prominent experts on Catholicism and Vatican activities. ↩︎
26
The change in the composition of the Council of Experts in 2009 provoked a negative reaction from many scholars, human rights activists, and representatives of religious minorities. Human rights defenders initiated the campaign “Say No to Inquisitors!” In 2015, some of the most odious supporters of the “fight against sects” were expelled from the Council, and A. Dvorkin was removed from the chairmanship and became deputy chairman of the Council of Experts (See: Change in the composition of the Council of Experts under the RF Ministry of Justice! https://www.protestant.ru/news/church/ofchrist/article/1122831 [only in Russian]). ↩︎
27
Lyudmila Mikhaylovna Alekseyeva (1927-2018) – Russian social activist, participant in the human rights movement in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia, one of the founders (in 1976) of the Moscow Helsinki Group, and its chair from 1996. ↩︎
28
Svetlana Alexeyevna Gannushkina (born March 6, 1942) – Russian human rights activist, educator, and public figure, chair of the Civic Assistance Committee. ↩︎
29
Human rights activists discerned the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the court’s ban of Jehovah’s Witnesses (https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/306527/). [only in Russian] ↩︎
30
Citing a number of publications: Conscience, Insight on the Scripture: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, 2019, Vol.1, p.500; “How Can You Maintain a Good Conscience?” Keep Yourselves in God’s Love, Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, 2008, Chapter 2; “Is Your Conscience Well Trained?,” The Watchtower, October 1, 2005, pp.12-15; “Let God’s Laws and Principles Train Your Conscience,” The Watchtower, June 18, 2018, pp.16-20, and many others. ↩︎
31
Armageddon (Har-Magedon), Insight on the Scriptures, Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, 2021, Vol.1, p.1038. ↩︎
32
From 1994 to 2018, I worked in the Analytical Department of the Office of the Federation Council. ↩︎